The question is not just what went wrong in Sri Lanka but what do the attacks say about the intentions of IS in this post-caliphate phase?
This post explains how this situation came about, and discusses some practical and moral problems with the government's current approach. I argue that more efforts should be made to repatriate these individuals, to help protect the children and where possible prosecute the adults. However, the post also points out some risks posed by my own preferred approach, as this is an inherently difficult situation.
No one, least of all in Australia’s Muslim communities, is surprised that an event like this has finally occurred, because all the signs that it was coming were there: measurable rises in Islamophobia and religion-based hate crimes, increasingly reckless political dog-whistling aimed at Muslims and at Islam and aired through both conventional and social media, and the increased mobilisation and mainstreaming of far-right commentary and protest that only a decade ago could barely be heard rustling in the bushes on the nation’s backblocks.
Part 1 showed that Australia’s jihadist plots had transformed following the rise of Islamic State in 2014. This post, Part 2, explores how the Islamic State’s rise helped prompt this transformation. The post looks at how the organisation achieved its global reach, the sorts of instructions it gave to aspiring attackers across the world, specific Australian circumstances, and the question of how police became such a prominent target. Read more
My first AVERT post examined which Australian terrorist plots had been genuinely connected to Islamic State, and what forms these connections took. For this post, I look at the wider impact Islamic State had on Australia’s terrorist threat.
This post will show how the threat has changed since the Islamic State’s rise in 2014 while the next post, Part 2, will discuss why these changes came about.